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DISPARATE IMPACT AND EQUAL PROTECTION AFTER RICCI V. DESTEFANO
BY MARCIA L. MCCORMICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
This country has a long history of embracing expansive values and tolerating abuses of
those values at the same time. These contradictory attitudes are evident in our approach to
equality. We talk of equality as a core American value but tolerate significant levels of
subordination of particular groups, often even groups that have historically been subordinated.
We struggle with reconciling conflicts created by the pursuit of equality, pluralism, and liberty,
and strike the balance among them differently at different times. In the current attempts to
balance these interests, the Supreme Court is marking an increasingly formalist approach to the
question of discrimination, an approach that poses a danger to legislation with a more substantive
approach to equality. In this context, the Court is using the Constitution to limit Congress' power
to prohibit discrimination. While the bulk of this trend has focused on limiting the kinds of race
conscious actions state and local governments or the federal executive branch can take and the
power Congress has to stop discrimination by states, the latest trend suggests that the Court may
be focused on limiting the power of Congress to prohibit discrimination in private workplaces.
The prohibitions against discrimination in the United States are found in multiple sources
of law. The most well-known is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
principle that has been embodied in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as well.
Additionally, several federal statutes prohibit discrimination in employment,1 housing,2 public
accommodations,3 and education.4 Most states have constitutional and statutory prohibitions, as
well. Over time, the content of the antidiscrimination norm has been fleshed out in court
decisions, legislative debates, and in the media somewhat sporadically. The commitment to
equality is very present in the public consciousness5 and yet still contested enough that there are
gaps in consensus on the content of the norm.
Part of the reason for this lack of consensus is that the issue of discrimination in
employment has not been in the forefront of public debate the way it had been in earlier years.
Employment discrimination was one of the main focuses of the Civil Rights Movement in the
1960s, which led to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the employment title of which is
popularly known as Title VII. Early cases in the 1970s concerning that statute focused on what
*
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See e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2006).
3
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2006).
4
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (2006).
5
As a proxy for the level of public interest surrounding this issue, I used a search of the case name, Ricci v.
DeStefano, the subject of this article, in print news sources held in the LexisNexis database over 2008 and 2009.
That search revealed 1174 stories. The search for the term “employment discrimination” yielded about 1000 stories
in each month of 2008, and over 1500 stories for each month in the early part of 2009. In the last three months of
2009, the news stories were back down to about 900 per month.

practices constituted discrimination on the basis of race.6 Likewise, employment discrimination
was part of the central focus of the second wave of the feminist movement. Interspersed with the
wave of cases concerning race discrimination in the 1970s were a number of cases dealing with
discrimination on the basis of sex.7 In a wave following those cases, litigation under the Equal
Protection Clause in the 1980s addressed the use of affirmative action to benefit black people
and whether that was permissible or itself discrimination against white people.8 During that same
time, sex discrimination under Title VII continued to be litigated.9 Since then, most cases and
legislation involving employment discrimination have concerned the more technical and
procedural aspects of litigating the issue.10
And while there had been significant litigation concerning race and sex in the education
context,11 the content of the norm prohibiting discrimination in employment had not been
addressed by the Supreme Court in many years. At the end of its 2008 term, the United States
Supreme Court issued its first decision in decades addressing the content of the norm against
race discrimination in employment in Ricci v. DeStefano.12 The Court took a decidedly formalist
turn, instituting a color-blind standard to define discrimination under Title VII at least in some
circumstances.13 In a similar move in the 2010 term, the Court considered a case ostensibly about
the requirements for class actions that may have far-reaching effects on the content of the norm
against sex discrimination in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.14
At issue in Ricci was whether a city government’s rejection of promotional test results
that caused a disparate impact on firefighters of color was disparate treatment, and if so, whether
the city could defend its actions on the grounds that it was avoiding liability for the disparate
impact.15 The majority, dissent, and one concurring opinion debated those issues, but in the mix
6

E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that classifications on the basis of sex warranted
intermediate scrutiny); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down laws that kept women off of juries
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8
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
9
See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (ruling that victims of sexual harassment could bring
claims even where they did not suffer physical or serious psychological injury); Johnson v. Santa Clara Cnty., 480
U.S. 616 (1987) (approving affirmative action for women); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)
(recognizing that hostile work environment sex discrimination violated Title VII); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467
U.S. 69 (1984) (ruling that law firms may not discriminate on the basis of sex in promoting lawyers to partnership
positions).
10
See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Soc'y v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
11
See e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
12
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
13
See id. at 2673-74.
14
See generally Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
15
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673-74.
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was a concurrence by Justice Scalia, focused on a separate issue. Because the employer was a
government, the constitution applied to its actions, and the plaintiffs had alleged that the city’s
decision violated the Equal Protection clause.16 The majority held that the decision violated Title
VII and so did not address the equal protection claim. Justice Scalia, however, would have. 17
Justice Scalia posited that Title VII’s disparate impact provisions might violate the equal
protection guarantee that is part of the Fifth Amendment.18 His logic was this: by prohibiting
disparate impact discrimination, Congress required private employers to take race, and
presumably the other statuses protected, into account in order to be motivated to act in a
particular way because of that status; taking an action because of someone’s race would likely be
a violation of equal protection if done by Congress directly; because Congress could not
discriminate this way, the Fifth Amendment bars it from passing a statute that requires
discrimination by private parties.19 In Wal-Mart, the Court might have had to confront the
constitutionality of the disparate impact theory in the context of sex discrimination because the
employer action in that case was alleged to have been either disparate treatment or disparate
impact.20 Justice Scalia even wrote the opinion. However, the Court ignored the disparate impact
issue entirely, and thus the constitutional issue, instead focusing only on whether the conduct
alleged would be disparate treatment.21
As Professor Richard Primus noted in his article, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, the constitutional issues surrounding the disparate impact theory of
discrimination have evolved significantly over time.22 First the question was whether the
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee embodied disparate impact. Most people assumed yes,
but the Supreme Court said no in 1976 in Washington v. Davis.23 Second, the source of
Congress’ power to prohibit disparate impact discrimination was called into question with the socalled federalism revolution.24 Only if it was within Congress’ power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment could disparate impact legislation be applied to the states consistent with
the Eleventh Amendment.25 The question in Ricci goes one step further: to the extent that the
prohibition on disparate impact discrimination requires employers to take race conscious action,
can Congress enact it consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process?
This paper argues that the answer is "yes" after the cases of the federalism revolution and
that Congress' power comes from the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments. However the
greatest dangers to disparate impact are the passage of time since the civil rights movement, the
16

See id. at 2664, 2672, 2681.
Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring)
18
Id. at 2.
19
Id. at 2682-83.
20
Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S. Ct. at 2548
21
See id. at 2552-57.
22
Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 494-95
(2003).
23
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
24
See Primus, supra note 22, at 494; see also Marcia L. McCormick, Solving the Mystery of How Ex Parte Young
Escaped the Federalism Revolution, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 909 (2009) (describing the so-called federalism revolution
and its impact on both civil rights legislation and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
25
See Marcia L. McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The Eleventh Amendment's Illogical Impact on Congress'
Power, 37 IND. L. REV. 354, 354-69 (2004).
17

lack of consensus that disparate impact is discrimination, and the worldview by several of the
Justices that discrimination against people of color and women is a thing of the past. In Part II,
this paper will describe the Ricci case with particular focus on Justice Scalia's concurrence. Part
III lays out the Court's jurisprudence on the federalism revolution and explains how that
jurisprudence may apply to this question. Finally, Part IV briefly explores the dangers to
disparate impact that nonetheless remain.
II. THE RICCI DECISION
A. Background
The City of New Haven, Connecticut used a set of tests to promote firefighters to the
ranks of lieutenant and captain.26 The full process was this: the city would create a list of
qualified applicants, ranked in order; when lieutenant or captain positions became available,
promotions would be granted based on that list; the City was required to pick the person to be
promoted from the top three on that list; and the list would be valid for two years, after which
time a new eligibility list would have to be created.27 The list was created through an
examination process, which included both a written and an oral examination, designed by a
professional testing company.28 Sixty percent of the final score was determined by the written
test score and forty percent by the oral test score.29 The applicants who scored a certain passing
minimum were put on the list in rank order from highest to lowest score.30
After the tests were administered and the applicants for promotion ranked, City leaders
noticed that the highest scores were held by white applicants and the lowest held by black and
Latino applicants at a rate disproportionate to their numbers in the applicant pool.31 Sixty-four
percent of the white applicants who took the test for promotion to captain passed, while just
under thirty-eight percent of black and Hispanic applicants passed.32
The City could have asked the testing company for a technical report to analyze the
validity of the test – how well it predicted performance in the jobs it was required for – but did
not and instead simply interviewed the test’s designer and then held several days of hearings to
determine whether the list should be used.33 At those hearings, a number of witnesses testified,
some in favor of using the list,34 some taking no position on using it,35 and some against using
26

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009).
Id.
28
Id. at 2665-66.
29
Id. at 2665.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 2666.
32
Id..
33
Id. at 2666-71.
34
The test’s designer told the City leaders that the test was valid, that any disparity was caused by external factors,
and that the result was not significantly different from the City’s prior promotional examinations. Id. at 2666, 2668.
Several promotional candidates testified that the test was fair and that they had worked very hard. Id. at 2667.
Counsel for the applicants who became plaintiffs in the eventual suit argued that the City should certify the results.
Id. A retired fire captain from another state testified that the material tested was relevant to the jobs and that the
study materials were less extensive than for other departments. Id. at 2669.
35
One of the testing experts stated that the test was “reasonably good” and that the City ought to certify the test but
change the process in the future. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2669. Neither the retired fire captain nor the testing expert
called by the City gave any opinion on whether the test should be certified. Id.
27

it.36 Several witnesses, including the test’s designer, testified that they believed the test was fair
overall,37 some testified about racial disparities in written tests generally,38 and some testified
about alternative ways to measure qualifications, from weighing the portions of the test
differently to entirely different processes.39 At the end of the hearings, the members of the City’s
Civil Service Board, the body that had to approve the list, split on whether to use the test results,
and because there was not a majority in favor of using those results – the vote was tied – the list
was discarded.40
Several white and one Hispanic firefighter sued the City in federal court, arguing that
discarding the test results discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.41 In the proceedings before the district court, the City’s main defense was that City leaders
had not discarded the results because of the race of the plaintiffs, but had instead discarded the
results to avoid liability for discriminating against black and Hispanic applicants, upon whom the
test had had a disparate impact.42 The firefighters and the City filed motions for summary
judgment, both asserting that the material facts were not in dispute and that each respectively
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.43
The district court granted the City’s motion.44 The district court held that as a matter of
law, the “motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact
. . . does not . . . constitute discriminatory intent,”45 which meant that the City had not violated
Title VII. The court further held that such a decision was not based on race within the meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause because all of the test results were discarded and all races were
treated the same – members of all races had to start the process over.46 The firefighters appealed,
and the intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.47 The firefighters
36

Some firefighters testified that the test was not fair: questions were outdated or irrelevant to the job and the
materials too extensive and expensive. Id. at 2667. One firefighter from a neighboring town called the test
inherently unfair, and another suggested a validation study was necessary. Id.
37
Id. at 2667 (firefighters testifying that the test was fair); id. at 2668 (test creator stating that the test was neutral
but expressing surprise at the level of disparity). But see Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2667 (firefighters testifying that the
questions were outdated or not relevant to the City, and that the study materials were too expensive and long; that
the test was “inherently unfair”; that the results should be adjusted).
38
Id. at 2667 (testifying about a neighboring city’s practices); id. at 2669 (three experts testifying that written tests
often have some level of disparity based on race).
39
A competitor to the company that designed the test used testified that the City could have used “assessment
centers” in which applicants face realistic scenarios to which they must respond just as they would in the field. Id. at
2669. A firefighter from a neighboring town suggested adjusting the ratios or otherwise adjusting the final scores in
some way to negate the effects of the disparity. Id. at 2667.
40
Id. at 2671.
41
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2671.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 163 (D. Conn. 2006), rev.d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
45
Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
46
Id. at 161.
47
Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The court of appeals considered sua sponte
whether to rehear the case en banc, and voted seven to six to deny that rehearing. Judges Calabresi, Katzmann, and
B.D. Parker filed opinions concurring in the denial of rehearing. Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes dissented
from that decision. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (Calabresi, J., concurring); id. at 89

sought review of the decision by the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the case48 and
issued its decision at the end of the term.49
B. The Decision
The Supreme Court, in a five to four opinion written by Justice Kennedy, reversed the
lower court’s entry of summary judgment for the city, holding that the decision to discard the test
results was based on the race of the successful candidates, and this was intentional discrimination
that would violate Title VII unless the City had a substantial basis in evidence to believe that the
promotional process created a disparate impact on the black and Hispanic firefighters that would
violate Title VII.50 The Court further held that the City lacked this substantial basis in evidence.51
Because it had reversed the lower court on statutory grounds, the Court declined to analyze the
equal protection issue.52 Justices Scalia53 and Alito54 wrote separate concurrences, and Justice
Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion.55
Before analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in depth, it is necessary to lay out the
analytical framework for Title VII in a little bit more detail. Title VII provides in part that
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin;56
This provision is generally thought to prohibit disparate treatment, also called intentional
discrimination.57 To prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that an employer has treated
that plaintiff less favorably than it otherwise would have because of the plaintiff’s protected
status, in a case like Ricci, because of the plaintiff’s race.58

(Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 90 (Parker, J., concurring); id. at 92 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); id. at 93 (Cabranes, J.,
dissenting).
48
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009).
49
Id. at 2658.
50
Id. at 2673-76.
51
Id. at 2678-81.
52
Id. at 2672, 2681.
53
Id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Alito, J., concurring).
55
Id. at 2689 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). Remedies for disparate treatment include reinstatement, back pay, other
equitable relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1988, 2000e-5(g)
(2006).
57
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2672.
58
Id.; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-91 (1988) (holding that discriminatory intent
can be inferred from, in part, an overly subjective promotions process); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 13536 (1976) (holding that discriminating against pregnancy was not discrimination “based upon gender as such”).

Title VII also prohibits disparate impact discrimination, or discrimination in effects.59
When a plaintiff proves that an employer’s neutral practice has a disproportionate negative effect
on the plaintiff’s protected group, an employer can defend that neutral practice by demonstrating
that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.”60 The employer will nonetheless be liable if the plaintiff shows that the employer
refuses to adopt an available alternative practice that has less impact and still serves the
employer’s legitimate needs.61
1. The Majority Opinion: Avoiding Disparate Impact is Disparate Treatment
The Court in Ricci held that these two separate prohibitions conflicted in this situation,
essentially finding that a decision to act because a practice may cause a racially disparate impact
is a decision made on the basis of race.62 In the Court’s words, “[t]he City rejected the test results
because the higher scoring candidates were white.”63 Considering the race-based effects of the
testing and rejecting the test on that ground was taking an adverse action because of an
individual's race.
The second step in the Court’s analysis attempted to harmonize the conflict this premise
set up. The Court held that good faith fear of a disparate impact lawsuit cannot be enough to
justify acting because of an individual's race.64 That would allow employers to avoid liability for
racially motivated actions “at the slightest hint” of a disparate impact and to maintain some sort
of racial quota or balance.65
To avoid this result, the Court looked to affirmative action cases under the Equal
Protection Clause for an analogy, reasoning that affirmative action created the same kind of
conflict in equal protection doctrine that this collision of disparate impact and disparate treatment
created.66 Under the Equal Protection Clause, a government employer can engage in race-based
decisions like minority set-asides where there is a strong basis in evidence that such a decision is
warranted to remedy past discrimination by that government employer.67 The Court stated that
such a standard was appropriate to balance the competing interests at stake.68 That standard
59

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(2)(a)(2), (k) (2006); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971). The text
of Title VII as it was originally enacted embodies disparate impact, although the Court in Griggs did not rely on that
language for its opinion, and the majority in Ricci did not analyze that language. The operative language is:
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . .”
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(2). Remedies for disparate impact include reinstatement, back pay, other equitable relief,
and attorneys’ fees, but not compensatory and punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1988, 2000e-5(g) (2006).
60
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
61
Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
62
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674 (2009).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 2675.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986).
68
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675-76.

gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions,
allowing violations of one in the name of compliance with the other only in
certain, narrow circumstances. The standard leaves ample room for employers'
voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme and to
Congress's efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination. . . . . And the standard
appropriately constrains employers' discretion in making race-based decisions: It
limits that discretion to cases in which there is a strong basis in evidence of
disparate-impact liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act
only when there is a provable, actual violation.69
The Court limited the applicability of its holding to a situation like the one in Ricci,
stating that it would apply only after a promotional or hiring process has been established and
employers have told applicants the selection criteria.70 At that point, the employer “may not then
invalidate the test results, thus upsetting an employee's legitimate expectation not to be judged on
the basis of race.”71 By implication then, a race conscious decision related to a hiring or
promotional practice is only discrimination when it has been applied to specific people who have
a contrary expectation interest in that process. While the process is being developed, no specific
people have any particular expectations about that process, and no actual person is being judged
on his or her race.
Having set forth the test, the Court applied it to the evidence submitted to the district
court. The Court found that the City had demonstrated that the racial disparate impact caused by
the test was significant. The pass rates for the applicants of color were about half the pass rate for
the white applicants.72 This rate differential fell well below the level the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has said will demonstrate a disparate impact. 73 The EEOC has
developed regulations to define what kinds of evidence can show that the negative impact of a
practice on a protected group is severe enough to meet the plaintiff’s burden. The regulations
state that
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
(4⁄5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse
impact.74
Even if the pass rates alone had not demonstrated a significant disparate impact, the
ranking and selection process would have. For example, if the list were used, the City would not
have been able to consider any black applicant for a then-vacant lieutenant or captain position.75

69

Id. at 2676.
Id. at 2677.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 2678.
73
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008) and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 995-96 n.3
(1988) (plurality opinion)).
74
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2011).
75
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678.
70

Given the severity of this negative impact on applicants of color, the Court acknowledged
that the City was required to look closely at its examination process.76 However that hard look, in
the Court's view, did not provide enough evidence that the City would be unable to successfully
defend the test because the test was not job related, or that the plaintiffs would be able to show
that there were alternative processes that would cause less impact and still meet the City’s
legitimate goals.77 The Court found that there was “no genuine dispute that the examinations
were job-related and consistent with business necessity,” citing the care the test’s designer had
taken to design the tests and the statements of various witnesses to the hearings that the tests
were generally good.78 Additionally, the fact that the City had not requested the validation study
suggested to the Court that the City was not actually concerned that the tests were not job related
and consistent with business necessity.79 On the issue of other alternative processes, the Court
rejected them as not viable either because they were not really available or proven to meet the
City’s legitimate business needs.80
As its last step, the Court considered what action to take on the district court’s decision. It
decided to not just reverse the grant of judgment in favor of the City, but to enter summary
judgment in favor of the firefighters.81 The Court’s reasoning in a nutshell is this:
The record in this litigation documents a process that, at the outset, had the
potential to produce a testing procedure that was true to the promise of Title VII:
No individual should face workplace discrimination based on race. Respondents
thought about promotion qualifications and relevant experience in neutral ways.
They were careful to ensure broad racial participation in the design of the test
itself and its administration. As we have discussed at length, the process was open
and fair.
The problem, of course, is that after the tests were completed, the raw racial
results became the predominant rationale for the City's refusal to certify the
results. The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of the
candidates who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City had
established for the promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for
months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and thus the injury caused
by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the
more severe. Confronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test
results – and threats of a lawsuit either way – the City was required to make a
difficult inquiry. But its hearings produced no strong evidence of a disparateimpact violation, and the City was not entitled to disregard the tests based solely
on the racial disparity in the results.82

76

Id.
Id.
78
Id. at 2678-79.
79
Id. at 2679.
80
See id. at 2679-81.
81
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2681.
82
Id.
77

In addition to the majority opinion, there was a dissenting opinion and two concurring
opinions. Because the dissent responds to the majority, and one of the concurrences responds to
issues raised only by the dissent, I will describe the dissent first, and then the responding
concurrence. I will end this section with a description of Justice Scalia's concurrence.
2. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent approached the problem from a longer view, providing greater
context for the City’s action. She traced the history of discrimination by the City in its fire
department and the way that current practices seemed to freeze that prior discrimination. The
population of the City is nearly sixty percent black and Hispanic, and yet the leadership of its fire
department is primarily white.83 This country, and the City of New Haven, have a long history of
discrimination in firefighting in particular, caused by a combination of racism and a failure by
departments to use merit-based employment practices.84 The City of New Haven had, in fact,
been sued for race discrimination within the fire department.85 And while at the time of the list's
generation people of color were much better represented in the lower ranks of firefighter than
they historically had been, in the senior ranks, only nine percent of officers were black and nine
percent Hispanic.86 Furthermore, the City was not limited to using a written test under civil
service rules, but could have chosen from a variety of testing methods, including practical
examinations like the assessment center model.87 The City used the written and oral test only
because that is what it had been doing for two decades under its contract with the firefighters’
union and asked the testing company only to create that kind of test.88
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent viewed additional facts from the City’s hearings as relevant.
She noted that the city’s counsel emphasized that the statistical disparity alone did not create
disparate impact liability for the City.89 Testimony indicated that firefighters of color had
significantly greater obstacles in getting copies of the study materials than had the white
firefighters.90 Additionally, a firefighter from a nearby city testified that his city had changed the
weights given the oral and written portions of the exam because the oral portion was more job
related: it was able to address realistic scenarios that officers encounter.91 This change also
increased the representation of firefighters of color in leadership positions significantly.92
Furthermore, the testimony from the testing experts casts doubt on the validity of a written exam
to test performance-type positions.93 And finally, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the decision
not to use the list was made by the Civil Service Board and that the two members who voted not
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to use the list stated that they were concerned that the process used to create it was flawed.94 All
of these facts demonstrated significant evidence that the process used would not satisfy the
business necessity test and that there were alternatives which would serve the City’s needs at
least as well if not better that would not have the same impact.95
As a legal matter, the dissent focused on the importance of the disparate impact theory of
discrimination to Title VII, faulting the majority for suggesting that the theory, and Congress’
focus on the consequences of employers’ conduct, not simply motivation for that conduct, was
not part of that statute’s original, foundational prohibition.96 The dissent further noted that the
disparate impact theory is present in the original statutory language, which prohibits any system
that limits or classifies employees or applicants in a way that would tend to deprive those people
of employment opportunities or other otherwise adversely affect their status.97 Additional
language in the statute prohibited the use of professionally developed ability tests if those tests'
results were used to discriminate.98 Disparate impact is designed to ensure that employers
demonstrate that hiring and promotional processes bear a “manifest relationship” to the job they
are used for.99
Additionally, the dissent disagreed that acting to avoid a disparate impact could be
viewed as disparate treatment consistent with Congress’ design of Title VII.100
Observance of Title VII's disparate-impact provision, in contrast [to the cases the
Court draws the strong basis in evidence test from], calls for no racial preference,
absolute or otherwise. The very purpose of the provision is to ensure that
individuals are hired and promoted based on qualifications manifestly necessary
to successful performance of the job in question, qualifications that do not screen
out members of any race.101
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In fact, such a view was inconsistent with the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.
While the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit disparate impact discrimination, that
prohibition in Title VII helps to promote the use of race-neutral means to increase workforce
participation by people of color, a goal that the Court’s equal protection precedents encourage.102
The test that Justice Ginsburg would have adopted would have been that an employer
who discards a promotional or hiring process when the disproportionate racial impact of that
process becomes evident violates Title VII only if the employer lacks good cause to believe the
process would not withstand scrutiny for business necessity.103 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out,
there was no evidence to justify the sixty/forty percent ratio for the test scores as at all predictive
of performance in the job.104
Justice Ginsburg faulted the majority for not considering the definition of disparate
treatment as it has been developed through Title VII’s affirmative action cases. The Court had
previously held that voluntary consideration of the protected status of a person benefitted by such
a plan simply was not discrimination against those not benefitted.105 In fact, voluntary
affirmative action plans that consider a protected status as one factor among others help
“‘eliminate[e] the vestiges of discrimination in the workplace,’” which is the ultimate goal of
Title VII.106
Justice Ginsburg also warned that the majority’s holding would seriously frustrate
employer efforts to voluntarily comply with Title VII. The strong basis in evidence test, at least
in the stringent form used by the majority, seemed indistinguishable from requiring an employer
to prove an actual disparate impact violation against itself before it could act to prevent a
disparate impact.107 And related to that, she criticized the majority for entering judgment for the
plaintiffs, not allowing the City the chance to provide evidence to meet this newly defined
standard.108 In fact, because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had regulations
that allow employers even to take affirmative action, not simply refrain from acting, when faced
with facts suggesting an actual or potential adverse impact, the City might have been able to
avail itself of an affirmative defense in Title VII that provides a safe harbor to employers who
have complied with EEOC regulations.109
3. Justice Alito’s Concurrence: A Response to Justice Ginsburg
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Justice Alito’s concurrence focused primarily on the factual record developed before the
district court. In disparate treatment cases, when an employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions, the evaluating court must decide first whether that reason was really
nondiscriminatory – which the majority in this case analyzed – and if it was, must then decide
whether that reason was the real reason or instead a pretext for discrimination. Justice Alito’s
concurrence made that analysis.
In Justice Alito’s view, a reasonable jury could find that the City was motivated by a
desire to placate a politically motivated racial constituency.110 One of the most outspoken people
at the City’s meetings was an African American minister, who was a leader in the community
and a political supporter of the mayor.111 Justice Alito catalogued evidence of this minister’s
exhortations at the meeting and influence on the mayor and the mayor’s staff.112 Justice Alito
also listed facts that could suggest the mayor’s staff and city attorney tailored the information
presented to the City’s Civil Service Board to persuade the members to discard the test results,
and that the mayor made known that he would reject the Board’s findings if they certified the
list.113
In short,
Almost as soon as the City disclosed the racial makeup of the list of firefighters
who scored the highest on the exam, the City administration was lobbied by an
influential community leader to scrap the test results, and the City administration
decided on that course of action before making any real assessment of the
possibility of a disparate-impact violation. To achieve that end, the City
administration concealed its internal decision but worked – as things turned out,
successfully – to persuade the CSB that acceptance of the test results would be
illegal and would expose the City to disparate-impact liability. But in the event
that the CSB was not persuaded, the Mayor, wielding ultimate decisionmaking
authority, was prepared to overrule the CSB immediately. Taking this view of the
evidence, a reasonable jury could easily find that the City's real reason for
scrapping the test results was not a concern about violating the disparate-impact
provision of Title VII but a simple desire to please a politically important racial
constituency.114
This desire to please a politically important racial constituency played out in the form of
a motive to discard the results because of the race of the successful candidates, concluded Justice
Alito.115
4. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence: The Problem with Disparate Impact
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Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but cautioned that he believed the Court would
have to decide one day whether the disparate impact provisions of Title VII violate equal
protection.116 He agreed with the majority that an employer engages in disparate treatment when
it evaluates the racial results of a promotional or hiring process and makes decisions based on
those outcomes, and stated further that Congress cannot require employers to do this consistent
with the equal protection principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment.117 In other words,
Congress cannot require employers to discriminate, and avoiding a disparate impact is
discrimination.
And Justice Scalia seemed to find no difference caused by the timing of the employer’s
action. To him, the design of a system that avoids a disparate impact on a protected group is
discrimination whether or not anyone has expectations in the use of the process yet.118 He opined
that disparate impact liability might be constitutional if the disparate impact theory was
conceived of only as a means to get at intentional discrimination that is simply too hard to prove
using the usual models.119 However, in order to make the theory serve even that very limited
purpose, Justice Scalia thought that employers would need some kind of affirmative defense of
good faith or good faith plus hiring standards that are reasonable.120
Justice Scalia's view is narrower than the Court's jurisprudence in other areas would
suggest. The next section of this paper explores some of that in the context of the Court's recent
federalism jurisprudence. The Court has suggested in the past that disparate impact is a
reasonable prophylactic rule to enforce the prohibition on intentional race discrimination. It
should find the same thing to be true for sex discrimination, although there are dangers to the
viability of the disparate impact theory for both groups.
III. The Federalism Revolution and the Reconstruction Amendments
Immediately after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, the statute was challenged
on the grounds that Congress could not require private parties to stop discriminating. The
challengers focused on the public accommodations provisions and claimed that the statute
exceeded Congress's commerce clause power and deprived it of liberty and property without due
process.121
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court held that Congress could
prohibit private race discrimination at least by businesses that affect interstate commerce under
the Commerce Clause.122 The Court also rejected Fifth Amendment and Thirteenth Amendment
challenges. The Fifth Amendment argument was that the hotel was deprived of property without
due process of law or suffered a taking because it could not refuse the customers it wished to.123
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The Thirteenth Amendment challenge was that the law forced the hotel into involuntary
servitude by forcing it to serve customers it didn't wish to.124 The Court found the latter argument
particularly frivolous since the law was designed to remove the badges and incidents of
slavery.125
After Heart of Atlanta Motel, Congress's power to enact Title VII was mostly settled.
The bigger question was whether state action that was not intended to be discriminatory but
which had discriminatory effects was prohibited by the Equal Protection clause. For a number of
years, it was fairly widely believed that disparate impact was prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause.126 The Supreme Court rejected that proposition in Washington v. Davis in 1976.127 There
was no hint at that time that prohibiting discriminatory effects would pose a constitutional
problem, and in fact, the Court seemingly approved of such a rule, but thought Congress should
be the body to create it: "[E]xtension of the [disparate impact] rule beyond those areas where it is
already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment, should await
legislative prescription."128
Then the focus of litigation shifted during the late 1980s and 1990s to affirmative action,
and the Court's decisions in that area, taking equal protection doctrine into new formalist
territory, created the tension that Richard Primus highlighted in his 2003 article, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, and Justice Scalia latched onto in his
concurrence in Ricci. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a plurality of the Court stated
that any consideration of race, even for benign reasons to benefit groups historically
discriminated against, was subject to the same level of strict scrutiny as considerations that
would harm groups historically discriminated against.129 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
the Court struck down an affirmative action plan the city was requiring its contractors to agree
to, a plan that involved minority set-asides for subcontractors, and a majority of justices finally
agreed that strict scrutiny should apply.130 In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held
that the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee should be made identical to the
Fourteenth Amendment's.131
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Thus began the shift to impose limits on Congress' power to prohibit or remedy
discrimination, a shift that gained new life when the Eleventh Amendment was reinvigorated in
1996 in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.132 The story of the Eleventh amendment begins with
Chisholm v. Georgia,133 in which the Supreme Court allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue
the State of Georgia for money damages in federal court.134 The Court found federal jurisdiction
over the action under the plain language of Article III, which gives the federal courts jurisdiction
over "[c]ontroversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . ."135 Almost
immediately, the Eleventh Amendment was adopted.136 The plain language of the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits suits "in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or . . . of any Foreign State."137 In Hans v. Louisiana,
the Court read more into that language, holding that it prohibited suits in federal courts not only
by citizens of foreign states but also by a citizen against his or her own state.138 Thus interpreted,
the Eleventh Amendment prohibited all actions by private parties brought in federal court both
against states as parties of record and state officials in their official capacities where the state
would be the real party in interest unless the states have consented to those suits or Congress has
validly abrogated their immunity.
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to apply to state and local government
employers,139 and shortly after that amendment, states challenged that as exceeding Congress'
power. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that Congress could validly abrogate state
immunity from suit under the Fourteenth Amendment and the other reconstruction amendments
because they shifted power from the states to Congress.140 The Court also concluded that
Congress had exercised its power under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting Title VII, but it
did not analyze whether Title VII was valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation because the
parties did not dispute it.141
In Seminole Tribe, the Court added new import to the question of Congress' power under
the Fourteenth Amendment when it held that Congress could not abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Commerce Clause, but instead could only do so under its
Fourteenth Amendment powers.142 The Court's reasoning went like this. Using a historical
132
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analysis, the Court found that state immunity from suit in federal court was part of the
constitutional design and that states did not give up this immunity by ratifying the
Constitution.143 The Fourteenth Amendment altered that arrangement, however, shifting power
from the states to the federal government, and thus amending both Article III and the Eleventh
Amendment to the extent they were inconsistent.144
Thus, Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment became more vital, and the
scope of Congress's enforcement power was fleshed out in a string of cases challenging laws that
purported to abrogate state immunity. The line of cases limiting Congress' power under the
Fourteenth Amendment began the year after the Seminole Tribe decision with City of Boerne v.
Flores,145 which assessed whether Congress could statutorily expand rights founded in the
Constitution.146 In City of Boerne, the statute at issue was the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA),147 a congressional attempt to change the law on the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise clause, enacted after an unpopular Supreme Court decision, Employment Division v.
Smith.148 In Smith, the Court had held that state statutes of general applicability that did not
purposefully discriminate against religious observance but only incidentally affected religious
practices would be subject to rational basis scrutiny.149 Public reaction to the seeming change in
the law was strong; Congress passed the RFRA in direct response.150 The RFRA provided that
any substantial burden on religion by a neutral law would be suspect, and it required legislators
to show that the statute was the least restrictive means to advance a compelling governmental
interest.151 Congress clearly stated that the RFRA was an attempt to “restore” the pre-Smith law
on the Free Exercise Clause; thus, it was a direct challenge to the Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution.152 In City of Boerne, the Court held that Congress could not use the Fourteenth
143
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Amendment to expand rights beyond what the Court had declared them to be, nor could it create
remedies out of proportion to a demonstrated record of Fourteenth Amendment violations.153
After City of Boerne, the Court continued its trend of invalidating legislation enacted
under the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
and Expense Board v. College Savings Bank154 and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board,155 the Court held that the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act156 and the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act157 were not
valid enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment.158 It also held that two civil rights laws
exceeded Congress’ power under Section 5: In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,159 the Court
held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act160 was not congruent and proportional to
any documented pattern of constitutional violations by states; 161 the Court held the same thing
for Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act162 in Board of Trustees v. Garrett.163
In both of the civil rights cases, the Court began its analyses by looking to what the
constitutional test was for discrimination on the basis of the statutes’ protected statuses.164
Because both age and disability classifications received rational-basis review,165 that is, decisions
based on age and disability were presumptively valid, the statutes, which arguably made such
decisions presumptively invalid, were not congruent to the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Without a
record of constitutional violations by the states, any remedy for those decisions was out of
proportion to any constitutional harm.167
The significance of the Court’s use of the constitutional test as the starting point and the
importance of characterizing the statute’s function became clear in Nevada Department of
Human Services v. Hibbs.168 In Hibbs, the Court found the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA)169 to be within Congress’ Section 5 powers.170 The FMLA requires, among other
things, that employers allow employees of either sex up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave at the
birth or adoption of a child or to care for a seriously ill family member.171 Rather than
characterize this as an entitlement program, which is subject to only rational-basis review, the
153

See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20, 536 (holding that, while Congress has broad authority under the
Constitution to adopt legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court retains the right to determine
whether such legislation amounts to an abuse of authority under the Constitution).
154
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
155
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
156
Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992).
157
Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114, 1122, 1125, 1127 (1994)).
158
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. and Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 647 (involving the Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act). Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.n Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. at 690-91 (involving the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act).
159
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
160
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006)).
161
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 63.
162
Pub. L. No. 101-336, Title I, 104 Stat. 327, 330-37 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-117 (2006)).
163
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
164
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84, 86-88.
165
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
166
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
167
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-91.
168
Nevada Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 722-24 (2003).
169
Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 2, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006)).
170
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726.
171
29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(1) (2006).

Court characterized the family care leave provision of the FMLA as remedying discrimination on
the basis of sex.172 Allegations of sex discrimination receive heightened scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment.173 Because widespread discrimination on the basis of sex had been
recognized by the Court in so many cases and the remedy Congress chose to enforce the leave
provisions was fairly close to what the Fourteenth Amendment would require for voluntary
employer-leave policies, the Court upheld the FMLA as valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment.174
The Court shifted its tactics a little by using an as-applied analysis in Tennessee v.
Lane.175 In that case, the Court upheld Title II of the ADA, which requires government bodies to
provide access to government buildings and services to those with disabilities.176 The Court
found the legislation validly abrogated state sovereign immunity, at least as far as it mandated
access to courthouses and other functions of government, which is protected under the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances and to participate in the
political process.177 Then in two bankruptcy cases, Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,
and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court held that Congress could subject the
state to suit in bankruptcy proceedings under its Article I bankruptcy powers.178
The Court's as-applied approach cut the other way in the Court's most recent Eleventh
Amendment case, Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland.179 Coleman involved a state
employee whose employment was essentially terminated after he requested leave to care for his
own serious health condition.180 He alleged a violation of the FMLA and sued the state for
damages.181 Although the Court had held in Hibbs that the FMLA was valid under Congress'
section 5 power,182 that case had involved an employee fired for taking leave to care for a family
member.183 The self care provision of the FMLA was not at issue in Hibbs.184 Looking only at
the self care provision, the Court in Coleman held that there was insufficient evidence that the
self care provision was tied to sex discrimination or any other constitutional violations by states,
and so it was not within Congress' section 5 power.185 Notably, Justice Scalia, in a concurrence,
would have held that outside of race, Congress' enforcement power is limited to regulating
conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.186 Only Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
172
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would hold that Congress may validly abrogate state immunity from suit under its Commerce
Clause powers.187
The Court has also taken a restrictive view of federal power in other civil rights contexts:
habeas corpus jurisdiction188 and voting rights cases.189 And in a move similar to the one in
Ricci, the Court avoided deciding whether the Voting Rights Act exceeded Congress' power in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One. v. Holder, issued just a week before
Ricci.190 Justice Thomas would have held that the statute exceeded Congress' power.191
While the Court has not yet analyzed whether disparate impact liability or other
provisions of Title VII and related laws are consistent with Congress's powers under the Fifth
Amendment, the lower courts have generally held that they are within Congress' power, usually
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but sometimes under other amendments, as well. For
example, in Alaska v. EEOC, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, upheld damages actions against state
employers brought by policymaking employees for discrimination and retalitation because the
state action would have violated the Fourteenth and First Amendments.192 The Seventh Circuit
held that at least for cases that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress acted validly
under its Fourteenth Amendment power in extending Title VII liability to the states, in Nanda v.
Board of Trustees,193 and in enacting the Equal Pay Act, in Varner v. Illinois State University.194
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in Warren v. Prejean,195 upheld the retaliation provisions of Title
VII as valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, in Maitland v. University of Minnesota,196 held
that the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII were valid, and in Okruhlik v. University of
Arkansas,197 held that the prohibitions on disparate treatment and disparate impact on the basis of
race and sex were valid. Finally, in In re Employment Discrimination Litigation,198 The Eleventh
Circuit held that providing for damages for disparate impact discrimination is within Congress’
powers Under the Fourteenth Amendment.199
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Not every provision has been upheld, however. The Seventh Circuit, in Holmes v. Marion
County Office of Family and Children,200 held that religious accommodation provisions of Title
VII were not valid under the Fourteenth Amendment because the accommodation requirement
was more onerous than that imposed by the First Amendment, and the legislative history of Title
VII did not reveal widespread discrimination by states on the basis of religion.201
Were the Court to take up the validity of Title VII's disparate impact provision, the
outcome may well depend on the case. The Court has been approaching these issues in the last
few cases in a very narrow way, looking only to the statute's validity as applied to the particular
case before the Court. Thus, where the disparate impact theory is used to get at cases where
intent is too difficult to prove, but which are really disparate treatment kinds of cases, Justice
Scalia suggested that disparate impact would be a theory that could shift the burden to an
employer to disprove that protected class played a role in the decision. It would seem that
situations in which employment decisions are left to the wholly subjective discretion of a
supervisor might be the kind of case that this would apply to, but Justice Scalia's outright refusal
to even consider the issue in Wal-Mart v. Dukes suggests that he is thinking of some other type
of situation.202 The prohibition on disparate treatment does not appear to be in constitutional
danger. The government acts consistently when it refrains from or prohibits classification on the
basis of race and sex, at least, and so Congress likely has the power to order private parties to
refrain from classifying on the basis of race and sex. Moreover, the commerce clause still forms
a basis to support that prohibition, and unless the Court holds that refraining from discrimination
is also discrimination, there does not seem to be a way to create a conflict with the equal
protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.
As for the form of disparate impact recognized in Griggs, and further codified by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the analysis should be similar to the analysis of Congress's powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment in the Eleventh Amendment cases. There are a couple of
differences, though. On the one hand, federalism concerns, which would limit Congress's power
would not be present because the focus of the law is on private parties, although it applies to
states as well. On the other hand, the special grant of power to Congress and away from the
states is not relevant, or at least not relevant in the same way that it was in the Eleventh
Amendment context. And finally, the Thirteenth Amendment would be an additional source of
power over private parties. In short, Congress would seem to have more power to create rules to
govern the conduct of private parties than it has to govern the conduct of states.
The content of the equal protection norm contained in the Fifth Amendment must be
informed by the content of that norm in the Reconstruction Amendments. Whatever the original
content of the Fifth, when the Reconstruction Amendments were adopted, they amended the
Fifth, just as they amended article III and the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, Congress should
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have considerably more power to provide for judicial remedies against private parties because
private parties have fewer constitutional protections from litigation than do states. There is no
constitutional immunity from suit that private parties have comparable to the immunity from suit
that states have.
Congress should be able to create individual rights or rights to judicial remedies under
any of its enumerated powers so long as those rights are necessary and proper to carry out its
enumerated powers. It is true that Congress's power is limited by the Fifth Amendment's
guarantees of due process, which include now an equal protection component, but that
amendment cannot limit Congress's power to enforce the substantive guarantees of the
Reconstruction Amendments. To the extent those might conflict, the later adopted amendments
must control.203 Additionally, Congress gets some leeway to decide how best to enforce the
guarantees of those constitutional provisions. As long as the remedy provided is congruent and
proportional to a record of injuries, Congress can provide for prophylactic rules that exceed the
remedies the Court has provided directly under the constitution.204
This legislative record is full of testimony about private employers refusing to hire people
who were not white, limiting them to the hardest and least prestigious work, paying them less,
and segregating their workforces.205 More was noted in the legislative record leading to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which gave the EEOC the power to enforce Title
VII.206 This record also detailed discrimination on the basis of sex, which was mostly missing
from the legislative history of Title VII. 207 Certainly the kind of exploitation of workers that
these practices represent and the resulting dependency that a permanent racial underclass or a
permanent sexual underclass would lead to would be the kinds of things the Thirteenth
Amendment would reach.208
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Given the anti-subordination goals of the Thirteenth Amendment, it may actually prohibit
disparate impact discrimination by itself.209 But at the least, that Amendment, which gives
Congress specific powers of enforcement just like section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
combination with the extensive record of subordination of women and people of color in
employment, would allow Congress to prohibit disparate impact discrimination in employment
as a means to put a greater burden on employers to insure against discrimination in their
employment practices whether carried out by actors fully self-aware of their discriminatory
purposes or practices that were not necessary for job-related reasons that inadvertently burdened
members of groups historically subordinated.
IV. THE DANGERS TO DISPARATE IMPACT THAT NONETHELESS REMAIN
Thus, in line with the Court's analyses of other statutes and Congress's power under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the disparate impact provision seems to be within Congress's power
under it, under the Fifth Amendment as modified by the Fourteenth, and under the Thirteenth
Amendment. Even so, there is still some risk that the Court might not accept this analysis.
Where the Court has upheld statutes that create rights beyond what the Constitution
would require, it has generally done so at times relatively close to that of the legislation's
adoption.210 And time may matter.211 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, for example, the Court
found that Congress could, in the Voting Rights Act, prohibit conduct the Constitution would
permit, in part because the Act was limited in time, that provision was limited in geography, and
the remedy was limited to the most egregious practices.212 Decades have passed since Congress
made a legislative record documenting widespread discrimination. It is possible the Court would
not see a continuing need for more prophylactic remedies.
And continuing the theme of change with the passage of time since the civil rights era,
there are a number of additional tensions in the employment discrimination context that only
seem to grow. It is not clear, for example, how this view of disparate impact as discrimination
can be reconciled with prior Supreme Court opinions upholding voluntary affirmative action by
employers as not discrimination.
In the end, much in this area seems to be about framing the issues – a task that is harder
for supporters of Title VII with the passage of time because even if at one time we had
consensus, we no longer do on fundamental issues like what discrimination is and what form of
equality is embodied by the concept of equal protection; whether disparate impact is actually
209
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discrimination – or at least discrimination that should be illegal; whether disparate impact is a
form of affirmative action or a guard against disparate treatment; whether affirmative action is
insurance against discrimination, a remedy for past discrimination, or a remedy for social
discrimination; and whether there is a tension between group-based harms and individual harms
and if so, how to balance that tension.
...
When the Court first issued its decision, the reaction of scholars and practitioners in the
area was somewhat unusual. Often, people in this area divide along client-focused lines into a
labor side and a management side. The Ricci case presented an unusual convergence of interests
because the employer here sided with the usually disadvantaged group of employees. So most of
those who are usually labor side advocates had aligned with management side advocates in
urging the Court to affirm the lower court’s decision. When the decision was issued, both labor
and management advocates bemoaned the result.213 The split in opinion on this case was along a
different fault line: strict legal formalists and everybody else.
Based on the Court’s recent decisions in the context of higher education, particularly
Justice Roberts’ statement that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race” in a recent voluntary desegregation case, 214 the resort to
formalism in the employment discrimination context should not have been surprising. And yet
for many scholars at least, it was, primarily because most of us did not think of the City’s actions
as being caused by the races of the test takers who had done well. And disparate treatment law
generally requires that an actor act “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ . . . adverse effects
upon an identifiable group” to be considered to have a discriminatory purpose.215
We may have come to expect the use of a color-blind or strictly formalist approach when
a government considers race as a factor in the promotional process, so that even though that
approach has not been imported into Title VII, its importation would not have been surprising.
But, this was not a traditional affirmative action case, where the employer explicitly uses race as
a criteria for hiring or promotion. In fact, if you believe the City’s defense that it had a good faith
belief that the test caused a disparate impact, a contention that the Court accepted, the race of the
successful test takers was considered only as a point of comparison to the race of the
unsuccessful test takers. To get to the conclusion that the majority reached, then, required several
steps, none of which was a foregone conclusion.
If we accept the City’s contention about its motivation, its thought process would have
looked like this: 1. City leaders know the results of the exams and the breakdown of candidates
by race; 2. City leaders deduce that the black and Hispanic applicants passed at a rate of half or
less than the rate at which white applicants passed and that they are ranked respectively lower; 3.
City leaders are concerned that the results are not likely to have occurred by chance and so are
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concerned that the process at least looks like it has caused a disparate racial impact; 4. the City
leaders know they will be sued if the process has caused a disparate racial impact or even looks
like it has; 5. the City decides not to use the results of the process based on a desire not to get
sued for the disparate racial impact.
The last step, to infer that a desire not to get sued for a disparate racial impact action is by
definition a desire to use race as the single criterion for acting is a bit of a stretch. To conclude
that the results of the process were discarded because of race of the plaintiffs, the majority had to
equate the desire not to discriminate against two groups (or at least not to get sued for
discrimination) with a desire to discriminate against another group. In other words, that
knowledge of the races of individuals or race consciousness automatically equated with race
discrimination. As a normative matter, this premise is troubling. To say that concern over the
possibility of a discriminatory effect is itself a discriminatory motive seems to create a terrible
theory of discrimination, a moral equivalence that automatically pits groups against one another
in zero-sum fashion in competition for jobs.
We have come a long way in the more than forty years since Title VII was enacted. Race
is becoming less salient with every new generation of workers. A decision by the Court equating
Title VII compliance efforts with discrimination is likely to reverse that trend. And if that trend
is reversed, not only do we freeze our progress toward racial justice where we are, or perhaps
move backwards, but we also make race something always to be contested, a zero-sum game,
with every promotion given to a person of color an injury to a white person. Suggesting that
white people are injured when an employer decides not to act out of concern that the action
would discriminate reinforces the notion that white people have some sort of greater entitlement
to jobs or promotions than do people of color.216 It creates an incentive for white people to resist
employer compliance with Title VII, and it creates an incentive for white people to resist social
advancement of people of color in other settings as well. Such an incentive would take racial
politics back to the 1960s or before.217
The Court’s decision thus represents implicit rejection of the basis for the Court's early
decisions on Title VII, that discrimination in employment was common, that absent some other
good explanation for an adverse action, discrimination was a reasonable explanation for it, and
that without incentives, employers would not look critically at what was really required to
perform a job and whether this individual could do that. Instead, they could rely on old proxies
for fitness without examining them critically. Now it seems that the Court is concluding that
discrimination against people of color is rare and assertions of discrimination are suspect, and
that the continued lack of attainment by people of color is because of limitations in those people,
not obstacles in the system. And that worldview likely really drove the decision. Much of the
Court’s discussion shows a number of such background assumptions: that written tests are valid
predictors of merit regardless of the type of job, at least when designed by testing experts; that
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efforts to make a test race neutral are more important than the effects of the test; and when
distinctions based on race are made, white people are injured.218
This latter point is especially interesting in this case, because it demonstrates perhaps the
biggest weakness in the majority’s approach, at least from a conservative viewpoint – that it was
not color blind or formalist at all. The Court’s usual formalist approach looks first to the explicit
distinctions an employer makes. If the employer does not make a distinction explicitly using a
protected status, then the distinction will not be “because of” that protected status at first glance.
A plaintiff may prove that the non-protected-class criterion was actually used as a proxy to target
people in the protected class, but usually that criterion has to line up perfectly with the protected
class.219 And so discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, itself not gender per se, was not
discrimination on the basis of sex because even though only women could be pregnant, the nonpregnant category included both men and women.220 Here, the City’s explanation that it feared a
disparate impact suit was not race per se. Moreover, applicants who would have been promoted
had the list been used included applicants from all backgrounds, and the pool of those who
would get a second chance at promotion if the list were discarded also included members from
all backgrounds. There was no strict formal separation on the basis of race.
The Court’s decision also presents a number of other doctrinal problems. Before this
decision, the employer’s reason and whether that proffered reason was a pretext for
discrimination were viewed as subjective matters. The question was not whether the employer’s
reason was correct as an absolute matter, but whether the employer honestly believed in the truth
of the reason.221 While the Court insisted that it was not dealing with the subjective motivation of
the City, its opinion reveals some significant sleight of hand, essentially getting to the subjective
issue without admitting it. By focusing on the amount of evidence that the City had before it and
requiring such evidence to be “substantial,” the Court implicitly suggested that it did not believe
that the City was actually motivated by a fear of disparate impact liability. Why else discuss how
easy it would be for an unscrupulous employer to use the fear of litigation as a pretext for
making decisions based on race alone?222 If the Court were really concerned that the claim would
be easy to use as a pretext, it could have analyzed the case as involving pretext instead of trying
to expand the definition of discrimination. Alternatively, the Court could have suggested that the
appropriate analytical tool was to analyze the City’s actions as causing a disparate impact on the
white firefighters. Both of these are strategies used when neutral appearing reasons are actually
covers for intentional use of a protected status as a qualification.
If the Court had been consistent with prior cases and treated the issue as a question of
pretext, though, it would not have been able to enter summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The
only question that would have remained was whether the defendants honestly believed that the
process might cause an illegal disparate impact sufficient to provoke litigation and whether they
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wanted to avoid that result, or instead whether the defendants desired to deny promotions to the
plaintiffs because they (or at least the majority of them) were white. In other words, the question
would be whether the defendants used race or a race linked criterion as a proxy for fitness for
promotion. That is a factual question. If we take the majority’s acceptance of the City’s reason or
Justice Ginsburg’s view of the facts, the Court would have had to affirm the grant of summary
judgment. There was simply no evidence that the City decision makers acted because the most
successful candidates were white, and they did not want white firefighters to get promoted. And
even if we take Justice Alito’s view of the facts, reaching that question would have still have
required the Court to remand the case to the district court for trial on the issue of pretext. Justice
Alito emphasized that a reasonable jury could find that the fear of a disparate impact suit was
simply a pretext for placating a vocal racial constituency; he does not say that he would have
held as a matter of fact that this was the City’s actual motivation.223
Other doctrinal problems created by the case relate to the series of inferences the Court
had to have made to conclude that the City was motivated to not use the list because of the race
of the successful candidates. First, the Court makes something of a leap between knowledge of
the races of the applicants and a desire to act because of race alone. The Court may have made it
easier for plaintiffs to prove discrimination. A plaintiff may be able to prove disparate treatment
by proving that the defendant knew the plaintiff’s protected status and made an adverse
employment action injuring that plaintiff, because making a decision in light of that knowledge
made the decision “because of” the protected status.224 Similarly, it is possible that the Court has
recognized some kind of transferred intent that benefits anyone injured by an adverse
employment action that was motivated by race, regardless of whether the race of the plaintiff was
what motivated the employer.225 And so, for example, the black and Hispanic firefighters who
would have been eligible for a promotion apparently have a cause of action for disparate
treatment in this case because the city was motivated in the Court’s view by the race of the white
firefighters. Similarly, if the city had decided not to use the list because some black or Hispanic
firefighters might be eligible for promotion, and they did not want to promote anyone of those
races, all of the white firefighters would also have a cause of action for failure to promote.
An additional doctrinal problem is posed by the fact that the City at least said it was
trying to voluntarily comply with Title VII. The goal of Title VII is to eradicate discrimination,
to change the social norms so that people no longer engage in acts that discriminate on the basis
of race, in other words, to avoid the harm of discrimination.226 As a part of that effort, this Court
has recognized that employers must be given incentives to voluntarily comply with the statute. 227
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To say that an action taken to avoid discriminating is itself discrimination may make such
voluntary compliance efforts incredibly more difficult if not impossible.
V. CONCLUSION
As the doctrinal problems described above show, the Court's decision in Ricci raises
more questions than it answers about where the law against employment discrimination is
headed in the future. Taken in the context of other recent cases, the Supreme Court's decisions
seem to be viewing the issue of discrimination in ever more simplistic terms, and the majority of
Justices seem to be viewing individual claims of discrimination by groups historically
discriminated against with increasing skepticism. Whether or not American society is truly postrace or post-sex, it seems that the majority of Supreme Court Justices are.
It is not only their view of sex and race relations that seems narrow, however. At least a
sizeable minority of the Justices seem to view government power, at least in some contexts, in
very narrow terms. The majority of Justices essentially held in Ricci that there were limits on the
way private employers can act as they scrutinize their employment practices to root out barriers
to equal opportunity. More importantly, the Court viewed that mandate to scrutinize employment
practices with substantial disdain. It may not be that large a step to Justice Scalia's suggestion
that Congress is limited in how it can address discrimination. Thus, Justice Scalia's concern
about Congress's power to prohibit discriminatory effects in the private sector is just one
example of the many dangers faced by our laws against employment discrimination.

